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Background
Overview
Politics
Economy
Separatist Movements
  Aceh
    Government Response
    Conclusion
  West Papua
Role of the Military
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Intergroup Relations
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Separatist Movements: Aceh
 
An intensifying conflict has been emerging from the resource-rich province of Aceh, posing a threat to Indonesian unity. Public support for rebel movements in Aceh has increased over the past decade as the Indonesian military has stepped up violence. Human Rights Watch points to three, key underlying causes of the conflict: failure to prosecute past abuses; failure to reduce the military presence; and diversion of locally-produced revenues to Jakarta.

The separatist group, the Free Aceh movement (GAM) first gained ground in 1976 under the leadership of Tengku M. Daud Beureueh. It declared Aceh a free Islamic state. It also accused the government of exploiting Aceh’s abundant natural resources without giving the region adequate compensation.

The movement’s resistance was crushed in 1977 but gained new momentum in 1989. At the time, many guerillas returned to Aceh from Libya, where they had received military training. By 1983, GAM membership had grown to about 1,000 (Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1, 2001, “The History of GAM”).

In 1989, GAM rebels carried out a series of attacks on soldiers and non-Achenese migrants in the region. In response, President Suharto designated Aceh an area of military operations (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM), and intensive counterinsurgency operations were carried out against the rebels. During this period, the Indonesian army exercised indiscriminate violence through a campaign of extra-judicial killings, torture, rape, kidnapping, and harassment, resulting in some 6,000 deaths.

In 1998, the DOM was lifted and, as revelations of these atrocities surfaced, the public expected the government to respond. Then new President B.J. Habibie promised to inquire into the alleged human rights abuses but only a few cases were taken up.

With Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, GAM rebels began to escalate their activities. Another wave of people returned to Indonesia from training grounds in Malaysia and Libya and began organizing throughout the districts of North Aceh, Pidie, East, West and South Aceh. As part of its strategy, GAM gradually began taking over local government functions. According to research by Human Rights Watch, GAM’s method for mobilization was through sermons (khotbah) preached at local mosques with the message: “Aceh has been oppressed too long, and with independence, all citizens will have guaranteed employment, free education, and a free pilgrimage to Mecca.”

For more information, please see Indonesia: Why Aceh Is Exploding.

Events in 1999 served to drum up public support for the rebel movement. Previously, most Achenese did not favor the rebel movement due to its violent nature. In addition to GAM’s recruiting efforts, the precedent set by independence movements in East Timor and the public’s increased outrage at atrocities committed by the military, served to draw many new supporters for a referendum in Aceh. In January 1999, an all-Aceh student congress proposed a referendum on Aceh’s political status, and activists, local government officials, and candidates for parliament in the June 1998 election took up the idea.

Demand shifted from referendum to independence, but at the students’ pro-referendum rally, people were attacked.





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