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| Role of the Military |
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History
The struggle for independence following World War II, required the creation of the idea of the nation-state of Indonesia, an idea to unite an archipelago that contains over 1000 islands and 30 major ethnic groups. The role of the military in using armed struggle to actualize the concept of a republic helped extend the military function of territorial security to include national development. From the time of independence through Sukarno and Suharto, the military continued to see itself as a unifying force between the people and the central government. Under Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, a multi-party system based on parliamentary was instituted but was ended in 1957 due to instability and an overwhelming number of political parties. At that time martial law was imposed and the government adopted a presidential system. The next eight years saw competing and rising tensions between the military and the communist party. As Indonesia refined its processes of "Pancasila Democracy", a national philosophy based on Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic traditions which was codified in the Constitution of 1945, the military reacted to communist and liberal influences and saw itself as the savior of national identity. Pancasila democracy is also based on consultation and consensus rather than confrontation. Soft distinctions between different spheres of political and social life have the potential to ease the processes of pancasila democracy.
When Suharto and the military assumed power in 1966, dwi fungsi, the concept of the dual function of the military, was legitimized and became official policy. Rationalized by various articles in the Constitution, the military was able to pursue the operations seen as crucial to national defense: intelligence operations, combat operations, and territorial operations. These operations included suppressing political dissent and quelling separatist organizations. The development of dwi fungsi during the Suharto era showed that the government considered counter-insurgency operation necessary to maintain the independence and sovereignty of the nation from an internal threat.
With the fall of Suharto, the zeitgest shifted and President Habibie greatly reduced the reach of the military forces. Military representation was reduced from 75 seats in the 500-member parliament to 38 seats. It was also announced that military personnel would retire from firms, the civilian bureaucracy, and local legislatures. Through actions such as placing the police under the Ministry of Defense, rather than the military, President Wahid continued to circumscribe the role of the military, but the reforms have not yet been completed. Military officers continue to hold about 10% of the seats in legislatures. During the era of reform and increasing civilization of leadership, the military faced an onslaught of criticism. An ICG report released in September 2000 states that the military's poor reputation was aggravated by their declining capacity to maintain public order and security. The violence and human rights abuses in East Timor and Aceh in 1999 further destroyed the credibility of the military (now known as the TNI).
Territorial Structure
Although the military's role in national politics has declined drastically, its political influence has not been entirely eliminated. The TNI still maintains a regional and local infrastructure presence that could be used as a channel though which to exert political pressure.
The army consists of centralized commands and territorial commands. This territorial command organization (see below) functions to complement the civilian administration. Within the territorial structure there are roughly 140,000 personnel spread throughout the archipelago. It is subdivided into 11 regional commands, or KODAMS*, headed by major generals. Each KODAM is divided into sub-regional military commands, KOREM, further subdivided into the KODIM, (district military commands), the KORAMIL (smaller sub district commands), to the bottom of the structure at the village level of BABINSA.
The territorial structure was rationalized by the defense doctrine that grew out of the experience of Indonesian forces during the nationalist revolution against Dutch colonial rule in the late 1940s. Over the years, this concept gained more power spreading throughout the archipelago. Since 1998 and the fall of Suharto, however, the TNI has been scaled back. Currently, the TNI hopes to continue the KODAM in conflict prone areas such as Maluku, East Kalimantan, Aceh and West Papua. Opposition to maintaining territorial structure has come from those in Aceh and West Papua where human rights abuses by the military has been widespread.
The territorial structure is scheduled to end by 2004 and the military's socio-political role would be limited to its representation in parliament until 2009.
| Civilian Provincial Structure |
TNI Territorial Structure |
| Province |
Territorial Military Command (KODAM, KORIM) |
| District (Kabupaten) |
District Military Command (KODIM) |
| Sub-district (Kecamatan) |
Sub-district Military Command (KORAMIL) |
| Village (Desa) |
Village NCO (BABINSA) |
* The names of the regional commands are acronyms.
Violence
The military has been criticized for its role its excessive use of force throughout the archipelago resulting in human rights abuses.
In November 1991 in Dili, East Timor, as many as 100 civilians were killed or wounded by TNI troops. Seven years later at Trisakti University in Jakarta, a military shooting left four students dead when students staged a free speech forum on campus and attempted to march to government headquarters.
Religious factions within the military have, at times, intensified tension between Muslims and Christians. For example, in a 1999 outbreak of violence between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, both groups accused different branches of the military of siding with the other group.
In addition, there is evidence that the military sold arms to militias and other groups on islands with significant ethnic and religious tensions including the highly vocal Free Aceh Movement.
Beginning in 1987, the central government authorized the military to treat Aceh as a Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer, or DOM), an arrangement that essentially placed the province under martial law. The DOM status was formally lifted in the summer of 1998. Then-president B.J. Habibie appointed a commission to investigate the reported human rights violations. However, to the dismay of the people of Aceh, only two cases were prosecuted and no military personnel were punished. This gave rise to claims of military impunity.
Criticisms have also been launched against the military for its failure to prevent violence. In the communal violence in Central Kalimantan in 2001, for instance, both the Dayak and Madurese cited the failure of the military to prevent the outbreak and spread of violence.
For more information, please see the following resources:
"Getting Away with Murder"
Economic Influence
According to the latest U.S. reports, military expenditures in fiscal year 2000 constituted 1.8% of the gross domestic product (GDP). The rest of the military budget is funded through business ventures. These businesses support military operations and increase the welfare of military personnel, their families, and civilians involved in the transactions.
Officers' involvement in business activities increases corruption, and strengthens state corporatism and nepotism. It also undermines military professionalism. Long-term economic stability is affected by these practices. In 1957, 246 Dutch businesses were nationalized.
Accountability
There has been limited accountability for military actions in Indonesia. This problem was illustrated in the case of East Timor, when, in the months surrounding its vote for independence from Indonesia, pro-Jakarta militias backed by the Indonesian military killed hundreds of people. Under international pressure to bring the military offenders in East Timor to justice, Indonesia agreed in 2000 to set up a special human rights court; however, it only did so in February 2002. It has named 18 defendants, including three army generals, a police general, and several middle-ranking officers, among others. The ad hoc tribunals have faced criticism because none of the top military officers have been implicated in the trials. Thus, while the Indonesian parliament has adopted legislation to establish new human rights courts, the road to successful prosecution for offences is far from smooth. In addition to East Timor, other cases of military abuses have yet to be investigated.
Future role
Within the TNI, there is growing dissatisfaction with the military structure. A small group of TNI reformers want to abolish dwi fungsi altogether. However, hard-liners want to maintain the current system and reject civilian supremacy over the military. The majority of TNI members are considered constitutionalists. They obey command, but are not satisfied with the current situation. The challenge is: Can the military accept civilian rule?
An increasing number of soldiers are unwilling to be sent to war zones like Aceh or Maluku. The TNI rank and file, where low morale and lack of discipline is widespread, is represented in this last group. The military is still represented in both houses of Parliament. Civilian leaders and several Indonesian NGOs favor abolishing the current system.
Efforts to hold the military accountable needs for the injustices it has caused have not gone very far. Former President Wahid's decision to separate the police force from the military changed the focus and role of the military. In her state address in August, President Megawati pledged her government to continue military reform.
For more information, please see:
"Indonesia: Next Steps in military reform"
Resources
For more information, please see the following resources:
Loyalty and Integrity in the Indonesian Armed Forces
The End of the Indonesian Military's "Invulnerability"?
Contemporary Indonesian Military Politics Lessons for Thai and South Korean Military Withdrawal and Democratisation
Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control
Updated May 2002
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