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Kalimantan 
   Overview 
   Background 
   The Conflict 
   Actors 
   Impacts 
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Kalimantan

Background of the Conflict

History of the Conflict
There is no agreed upon explanation for how the recent violence started. However, over the last two decades, tension has been rising between the Dayak and the Madurese.

The government’s policy of transmigration, instituted to alleviate population pressure in the overcrowded inner islands of Java, Madura and Bali and to develop the economies of the outer islands, has contributed to Dayak resentment of the Indonesian government. Although transmigration started at the beginning of the century, the numbers sent to Kalimantan were relatively small prior to the establishment of the Suharto government in 1966-67.

Under the Suharto government, transmigration increased substantially. Between 1971-1980 Kalimantan received more than 100,000 transmigrants. After 1980, the national transmigration program was expanded with the number of transmigrants placed in Central Kalimantan reaching almost 180,000 per decade. In 2000, transmigrants amounted to 21 % of Central Kalimantan. In Kalimantan, as in many areas where this policy was practiced, the large numbers of transmigrants exacerbated ethnic tensions between the new and existing populations and changed the demographics of Kalimantan considerably.

When the Madurese first settled in Kalimantan, they established their own communities separate from the Dayak. The two communities continued to coexist until recently, when growing inter-ethnic tensions between the two communities prompted the Dayak to regard the Madurese community with increasing hostility.

The 1960 Basic Agrarian Law No.5, which gave rights to customary communities like the Dayak, was not adhered to when the Suharto regime came into power. Instead, Suharto adopted new laws that provided the government with legal powers to allocate land for forestry and mining interests. The 1967 Basic Forestry Law stated that customary rights are only recognized when they do not interfere with the purposes of the law. The 1968 Mining Law gave the government power to allocate customary and other land for mining. With the passage of these laws, no barrier remained to prevent the government from opening transmigration projects and allocating forestry and mining concessions in areas occupied by Dayak.

The change in policy towards Dayak land tenure and the 1967-68 laws allowed for the large-scale development of Kalimantan’s forests by logging and plywood companies, and the construction of commercial plantations such as palm-oil plantations and paper plants. In many cases, logging companies were connected to members of the Suharto family, his associates and the military. Analysts suggest that exploitation was rampant. In West and East Kalimantan in particular, more forests have been exploited than in any other province since the government passed the Forestry Law.

Although the Dayak resented these policies, under former President Suharto, much of the potential violence was repressed by his extensive use of the military to control Indonesia’s provinces. However, since the end of his presidency, the central government has played a smaller role in the region and largely avoided intervening in provincial and local matters in Kalimantan. This has prompted the Dayak to take matters into their own hands.

The heaviest violence between the two groups erupted in West Kalimantan in 1996 and reoccurred in 1999. In 1999, there were several separate acts of violence between the two groups which further exacerbated tensions. Most recently, there was a massacre in Central Kalimantan in March 2001. These conflicts all inflicted a devastating loss on the Madurese community to the point where most survivors have fled Kalimantan.

For more information, see:

International Conflict Group. “Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan”, June 2001.

Sources of the Conflict:
Most analysts agree that the roots of this conflict lie in Dayak resentment towards the policies of the central government over the past few decades, which they feel have marginalized their community politically, socially and economically. The Madurese are not the largest migrant group in Kalimantan. However, they have been the targets of Dayak anger because of economic disparities between the groups and long-held stereotypes each group has of the other.

Migration: Madurese first began to arrive in Kalimantan in the 1930s, as the result of the government’s transmigration policy, which sought to relieve population pressures in Java, Madura, Bali and other overpopulated islands. These migrants came seeking economic opportunity, settled on marginal lands and provided workers for the mining and logging industries. When the transmigration policy ended in 2000, transmigrants made up around 21% of the population in Central Kalimantan, and 25% in West Kalimantan, not including descendents of transmigrants and migrants who came on their own. Migrants were given land grants and established a firm hold on commerce in some urban areas. As a result of the influx of migrants, opportunities available to Dayak diminished.

Migration and the resulting development of commerce and industry has forced the forest-dwelling Dayak to relocate further into the interior of Kalimantan and adapt to changed conditions. The increasing number of migrants threatened to make the Dayak a minority in what had traditionally been their land.

For more information, see: CNN Kalimantan’s Agony, The failure of Transmigrasi

Economic Tensions: The economic rivalry that has tarnished the Madurese-Dayak relationship contributed to the crisis between the two groups. The Madurese also controlled most of the small businesses and markets and dominated much of the labor in cheap transportation in urban areas of Kalimantan. Overall, the Madurese had become more prosperous than the Dayak.

Before the crisis, Madurese were the majority ethnic group in the important logging town of Sampit, Central Kalimantan. The Madurese had assumed control of the job market and much of commerce and the timber industry, at the expense of the Dayak who were previously employed in these sectors. In cities such as Sampit, the Dayak’s minority status, along with their under representation in the logging and commercial sectors created a high level of tension.

Government grants of Dayak land to companies for mining, logging and plantations have also been a source of discontent. Since these concessions were granted, Kalimantan’s forests have been rapidly destroyed. In Western Kalimantan, where exploitation of the forests had progressed further than anywhere else, many Dayak felt economically marginalized as their traditional lands were overtaken. Although the Dayak did not forcefully oppose the growth of logging, mining and agricultural plantations, they came to resent the loss of what they felt was their land and resources. They also believed that the benefits of these resources served to increase the wealth of the Jakarta elite at their expense.

Political: In Kalimantan, Dayak villages were historically governed by traditional institutions that varied greatly from village to village. A 1979 law, entitled Law on Village Government No. 5, called for the creation of uniform structures of local government throughout Indonesia. The law had the effect of undermining the authority of traditional village leaders and the cohesion of the Dayak communities. The disruption of the traditional village government system in Kalimantan contributed to the dissatisfaction of the Dayak with the government and has diminished traditional leaders’ ability to control conflicts. It combined certain villages and made it difficult for customary leaders to be elected as village head. Additionally, in Western Kalimantan, many component parts of villages were far apart, and as a result, some villages did not even know their village head.

Further, representation for the Dayak has been problematic. Dayak today are poorly represented in the government, civil service, police and army. In Western Kalimantan, only one of the province’s six districts, and also the most remote, is headed by a Dayak.

Reports suggest that it is commonly perceived among the Dayak that in areas where they are highly underrepresented, the police and military are biased against them. In part, this stems from the involvement of these organizations in protecting logging, mining and plantation companies operating on traditional Dayak lands. Also, analysts suggest that the Dayak tend to feel that when crimes are committed, Dayak are arrested, while crimes committed by Madurese are overlooked. While there may be some basis for this observation, the underlying reason seems to be economically, rather than ethnically motivated – it has been suggested that the well-off Madurese are better able to pay off police than the generally poorer, less politically connected Dayak.

Social and Psychological Stereotypes: One explanation of why the Madurese became the target for Dayak resentment includes the social and psychological stereotypes that each group holds of the other. As has been the case elsewhere in the country, Madurese have stereotyped the Dayak as inferior, backward and uncivilized. Dayak, on the other hand, have also stereotyped Madurese as arrogant, clannish, prone to violence, eager to cheat non-Madurese and untrustworthy.

Some analysts have suggested that the Dayak perceive the Madurese as “visitors” in their land and that unlike other migrant groups, the Madurese were not respectful of local customs and culture. Some Dayak claim that, while they have been accommodating and have tried to avoid conflict over single incidents of disrespectful Madurese behavior, over time, the grievances have accumulated.

For more information see:
“West Kalimantan at a Glance”, Inside Indonesia No. 51, July – September 1997,

Abigail Abrash, “The Victim in Indonesia’s Pursuit of Progress”, Indonesia Human Rights Network,

International Crisis Group, Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,





 




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