Relevant actors in the conflict include the Indonesian government, the Indonesian military (TNI), the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), SIRA, the ulama, and the international community.
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
The Free Aceh Movement, or GAM, was formed in 1976 under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro to achieve independence from the state of Indonesia. Although in the past it has been effectively and violently repressed by the military, since 1998 the movement has gained public support and control over many areas in Aceh, including, reportedly, three quarters of Acehnese villages. It has also taken over many of the local administrative and legal functions as the government administrators have fled from violence and intimidation. Reportedly those Acehnese wishing to marry need to obtain two licenses – one from the local government officials and one from GAM. Additionally, GAM collects an 8% “tax” on all building projects and also collects tax on land purchases. However, GAM has not taken over social welfare functions and remains primarily a guerrilla force. The revenue gained from the taxes is used to fund its struggle against the government. GAM personnel have in many cases filled the corruption void left by the fleeing administrators, local police and army representatives.
According to an International Crisis Group Report “Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace”, AGAM has an estimated strength of between 15,000 and 27,000. Observers, according to ICG analysts, estimate that AGAM is only lightly armed, with between 1,000 and 1,500 modern firearms. Reportedly, the movement has been receiving arms from Malaysia and Thailand, although many believe that its primary supplier of weapons is TNI (the Indonesian military) and the police. The movement has very little formal military training and observers believe that it would be nearly impossible for GAM to gain independence for Aceh through military force.
SIRA
SIRA, a student-led group advocating a referendum on independence, was formed in February 1999 following the referendum in East Timor. Unlike GAM, SIRA advocates self-determination – a choice between additional autonomy and independence –although members believe that, if given the choice, the Achenese people will choose independence. The organization is committed to non-violent means to achieve its goals and has been widely successful in building support. SIRA has successfully organized two mass rallies in the streets of Bandah Aceh calling for a referendum. Since the initialization of a special military operation in Aceh in April 2001, members of SIRA have been targeted by the government, which sees the organization as the political branch of GAM. Due to governmental restriction of the group’s freedom of movement and pressure on its leadership, its activities have largely been curtailed.
In January of 2002, Faisal Saifuddin, head of the Jakarta branch of SIRA, was sentenced to one year in prison for “spreading hatred” by organizing rallies calling for an end to human rights violations in Aceh.
Local Ulama Leaders
The ulama are Islamic scholars, a group that commands great respect and holds great moral and political influence over the people of Aceh. In 1998 a group composed of ulama was formed called Himpunan Ulama Daya Aceh (the League of Ulama of the Religious Schools of Aceh), supporting a referendum, but its political activity was not long-lived. This influential group has the potential to aid in the resolution of the conflict, but is not highly coordinated or active.
For more information on Ulama leaders:
http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/indonesia/reports/A400331_27062001.pdf
Indonesian Government
Since 1998, without exception, the leaders of Indonesia have stated their intent to address the concerns of the Acehnese and to curb secessionist sentiment in the province. All three of the post-Suharto presidents have apologized for human rights violations committed in Aceh during the period of military occupation known as DOM from 1990 until 1998. Furthermore, all three have continued a process of decentralization, which has provided greater autonomy to Indonesia’s provinces. Through recent legislation, Aceh has been given a greater share of the revenue from its natural resources, most pertinently from its oil and natural gas resources. Many in Aceh, however feel that government action has been insufficient. There are continuing calls for the prosecution of military officers responsible for crimes committed during the 1990s and for complete independence from the state.
President Megawati Sukarnoputri did not waste any time attempting to resolve the conflict in Aceh. She visited the province near the beginning of her presidency and has made it clear that secession is not a possibility. Her hard-line stance against GAM led to a marked increase in violence in Aceh.
The government began to be involved in facilitated negotiations with GAM through the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), a neutral third party in 2000. In July 2001, however, the government suspended meetings of the joint committees negotiating key security issues while both sides agreed to dissolve the joint committee working on humanitarian issues.
Indonesia has many interests – both economic and political – in maintaining Aceh as part of the republic. Approximately 30% of Indonesia’s export revenue comes from Acehnese resources. Even with a larger percentage of revenue going to Aceh, as mandated by the new autonomy law, Indonesia continues to benefit from Aceh. As a general principle, the central government is firmly committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of the state.
Military / Police
The military has been firmly entrenched in Aceh for the past two and a half decades. In 1990, the military was authorized to conduct a special military operation, known as DOM, in Aceh to eradicate the rebel movement. During the period of DOM, which lasted from 1990 to 1998, the military operated with impunity in the province, committing human rights abuses against the local population on a wide scale. After the DOM status was lifted, numerous allegations were made of murder, rape and torture perpetrated by the military. The military officers responsible for the crimes were not held accountable for their actions. As a result, the people of Aceh continue to distrust the military and to resent its continued presence in the region. The government’s failure to punish military leaders has given the military a feeling of impunity and abuses continue to occur.
Both the police paramilitary force, the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) and TNI, the regular army, have been carrying out operations against GAM. The Brimob forces have arbitrary rules of engagement, are generally not held accountable for their actions and often do not wear uniforms, a factor which enables group members to deny responsibility for their actions. TNI and Brimob have been known to raid and punish entire villages for suspected GAM activity, beating and torturing villagers to extract information and burning homes. )
The military as an institution has both economic and political reasons for wishing to maintain a presence in Aceh. The military is underpaid and has allegedly traditionally supplemented its salary through graft, corruption, bribes and business ventures. Further, the government is in the process of phasing the military out of political life and some observers suggest that, as a result, the military is contributing to continued violence in the province in order to justify maintaining a presence in Aceh.
ExxonMobil
ExxonMobil Indonesia is an important actor in Aceh. The corporation operates and partially owns the P.T. Arun fields, where the majority of Aceh’s natural gas is located. It also owns and operates liquid natural gas production facilities in the Lhokseumawe Industrial Zone (ZILS), and is developing a new project, in the Cepu block on the border of Central Java and East Java provinces. Because of its holdings and operations, ExxonMobil is a powerful economic force in Aceh.
Some allege that ExxonMobil has contributed to the conflict in a direct way. ExxonMobil has been accused of complicity in, or at least knowledge of, human rights violations such as violent interrogation and torture committed by security forces on company property.
In 2001, The International Labor Rights Fund filed a lawsuit against ExxonMobil on behalf of 11 villagers. The lawsuit claimed that Indonesian soldiers paid to protect the plant, a standard practice in Aceh and a source of significant revenue the military, committed murder, torture, and kidnapping.
On a more indirect level, both parties to the conflict have used ExxonMobil’s economic importance as leverage to improve their position. In March 2001, ExxonMobil closed its fields and facilities and evacuated personnel, stating that threats had been made towards their operations. The Indonesian government placed blame on GAM for making the threats that led to the closure. However, many in Aceh believe that the military actually made the threats in order to discredit GAM and to justify both an increase in security operations surrounding the Lhokseumawe industrial complex. Some also believed that the military may have made the threats in the hopes that they would receive an increase in protection money paid by ExxonMobil. In May GAM cut two pipelines from the Lhokseumawe industrial complex. In August 2001, the facilities resumed operations on a limited basis. They are not yet up to full capacity and their continued vulnerability threatens to deprive the central government and the state-owned oil company, Pertamina, of an important source of revenue.
The regional insecurity caused by the conflict has had a dramatic impact on Aceh’s revenue. It is estimated that the closure of the P.T. Arun complex has cost the government and ExxonMobil Indonesia a combined $350 million (US dollars) in lost revenue. The temporary shutdown had a potentially long-term impact on production as well – during the closure, ExxonMobil’s two largest customers, Korea Gas and Tohoku Electric Power (in Japan) were forced to seek alternative suppliers.
As of the fall of 2003, ExxonMobil is developing a new project, in the Cepu block on the border of Central Java and East Java provinces. It was awarded a 10-year contract in 2000 to develop the oil reserve, although it is in negotiations with the Indonesian government to extend that contract to 2030. The proportion of revenue that goes back to the Indonesian government is yet to be determined, though reports indicate that an agreement is expected in January 2004.
International Community
The international community has opposed Aceh’s bid for independence and supports the government’s initiatives to grant increased autonomy to the province. Aside from some shipments of small arms from expatriates in Malaysia and Thailand, GAM has not received support from outside of Aceh. Foreign governments have expressed their disapproval of using violence to quell domestic opposition. Support for autonomy and against force and military abuses has been mainly diplomatic in nature. The United States initially praised Megawati’s initial efforts to improve the situation in Aceh. After a burst of optimism following the cease-fire agreement, the international community has grown increasingly weary of new violence. Restrictions on humanitarian access in 2003 drew renewed attention to the province, and international concern has escalated regarding the situation of civilians in the conflict.
One issue for the Indonesian government has been what it perceives as the “internationalization” of the conflict, which it regards as an internal affair.
