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Sumatra
Background of the Conflict in Aceh |
History of the Conflict
From the beginning of Indonesia’s independence, the relationship between Aceh and Indonesia has been characterized by distrust. At the time of Indonesia’s independence, Aceh became a province and retained, de facto, a large degree of autonomy from the central government in recognition of its key role in the independence movement. In 1950, however, this status was revoked when President Sukarno merged Aceh into the province of North Sumatra. Many in Aceh felt betrayed by this move and believed that Indonesia had broken its tacit agreement to treat Aceh differently than the rest of the republic. Threatened by their loss of authority and angered by the establishment of Indonesia as a secular state, Islamic leaders in Aceh supported an armed rebellion known as Darul Islam (House of Islam) that aimed to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. President Sukarno restored Aceh’s provincial status in 1959 and granted Aceh special autonomy, a status that ostensibly allowed Aceh greater control over local government and religion. In practice, however, the special autonomy was never implemented.
The modern independence movement began in 1976 when Hasan di Tiro, leader of the rebel movement GAM, unilaterally declared Aceh an independent state. Due to its lack of funds, weapons, experience, and organizational structure, the fledgling group was easily neutralized by the military by 1977. The organization did not disappear, however; Hasan di Tiro continued to cultivate the organization from exile in Sweden. In 1989, the movement re-emerged, fueled by the return of approximately 250 group members from training in Libya. This small group attacked the local military and government on several occasions. Once again the Indonesian military sought to crush the insurrection, this time with overwhelming force. The central government authorized the military to treat Aceh as a Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer, or DOM), an arrangement that essentially placed the province under martial law. During the period from 1990 until 1998, it is estimated that 1,000 to 3,000 people were killed, 900-1,400 went missing (and are presumed dead), 500 were maimed, and 700 homes were burnt to the ground.
During the period of DOM, rumors of human rights abuses in Aceh circulated, but there were no formal reports. Following the resignation of Suharto, in 1998, a more open system began to emerge and in this new political environment allegations of murder, torture, rape, and other human rights violations emerged. The DOM status was formally lifted in the summer of 1998. Then-president B.J. Habibie appointed a commission to investigate the reported human rights violations. To the dismay of the people of Aceh, only two cases were prosecuted and no military personnel were punished, giving rise to claims of military impunity.
Since 1998, the rebel movement, known in English as the Free Aceh Movement, has gained momentum and popular support. It is now estimated that two-thirds of all villages in Aceh are under rebel control. In some villages GAM has taken over some of the functions of local government. Please see the following section on “Escalation” for more information on the renewed conflict since 1998.
Sources of Conflict
Many reasons have been offered for Aceh’s discontent with the Jakarta-based central government. The main driving motivations behind GAM and its widespread public support appears to be a feeling of economic “neo-colonialization,” the exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources, and a sense that the military acts with impunity in Aceh. Other reasons include Aceh’s historical sense of independence and its conservative religious identity.
Exploitation of Natural Resources: Relative to the rest of Indonesia, Aceh is a resource-rich province, particularly in terms of its petroleum and natural gas. The economy of Aceh constitutes approximately 2.5% of Indonesia’s GNP; fully 1.5% of GNP is from Aceh’s oil and natural gas. There is a longstanding feeling in Aceh that the population has not received adequate compensation for the central government’s exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources. GAM and other opponents of the central government have spoken widely of Indonesia’s neo-colonial behavior. Despite the land’s wealth, Aceh’s population is among Indonesia’s poorest.
Since Indonesia’s independence, the vast majority of revenue from Aceh’s natural resources has gone to the central government and to the corporate operators of the fields and production facilities. At the center of the discussion about Aceh’s economic relationship with the central government are the P.T. Arun fields around the city of Lhokseumawe in North Aceh. ExxonMobil Indonesia and the Indonesian state-owned oil company, Pertamina, own the fields jointly. It is estimated that the fields generate $1.2 to $1.5 billion US dollars per year in revenue. The Indonesian government recognizes the economic discontent of the Acehnese population and has taken measures to alleviate this source of unrest. As a result of legislation passed in2001, Aceh has received a larger percentage of revenue from its resources. Many consider the new arrangements to be insufficient, however, and many more doubt Indonesia’s intent and ability to follow through with increased revenue sharing, because of broken promises in the past and IMF-mandated austerity measures that may cause the government to use Aceh’s revenue to pay off the fiscal deficit. According to the International Crisis Group, the problem is not with the funds, but with a corrupt regional government that does not properly allocate them. (See ICG’s “A Fragile Peace”, pages 9-10).
For more information, see:
Military Impunity: Past and continued instances of military impunity and repression eroded Aceh’s faith in the central government’s ability to govern fairly. Following the lifting of the DOM, many in Aceh believed that President B.J. Habibie would bring those from the military responsible for committing atrocities to justice. By and large, the Acehnese were disappointed by the central government’s inaction in redressing these wrongs. It was widely hoped that Habibie would move quickly to punish those responsible for crimes committed during the 1990s. Although the government and military did issue apologies, prosecution of military officers did not occur and the military presence in Aceh continued.
Subsequent presidents have similarly failed to satisfy public concerns. In June 1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid authorized an independent commission on Aceh to investigate reported human rights abuses from the DOM period. In July, the commission handed back a report that listed thousands of alleged crimes, but recommended only five cases for prosecution. Of these five, only one went to trial.
In general, Acehnese believe that the perpetrators of the crimes escaped without punishment. According to a Kompas poll, 80 percent of Acehnese and 76 percent of non-Acehnese respondents were unhappy with the failure to prosecute offenders of human rights in Aceh. Disappointment with the government’s continued failure to redress wrongs from the DOM period has led to increased support for GAM and for the student-led movement for a referendum on independence
History: The province of Aceh takes considerable pride in its historic independence and consistent rejection of domination by external authorities. The roots of this pride stem from fierce Acehnese resistance to Dutch colonialism from 1873 until the end of World War II. The rebel movement in Aceh has drawn upon this history and nationalistic pride to fuel the current separatist rebellion.
Religion: While Indonesia is predominantly a Muslim country, the state government is secular, governed by the five-pillar philosophy of Pancasila. Many Acehnese however, consider themselves more strictly Islamic than the rest of the republic and there is a strong movement within Aceh for the province to be governed under a system of Islamic law, or Sharia. The most recent autonomy law, passed in August 2001 addresses the concern over religion by authorizing Aceh to introduce Islamic law in the province. While religion has been cited as one of the contributing factors to Aceh’s sense of independent identity, it is not the primary drive behind the independence movement. GAM, the leading separatist organization, is a nationalist movement, not a religious one.
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