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Sumatra
The Conflict in Aceh |
Escalation
The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 marked the beginning of the present conflict. Almost immediately following Suharto’s resignation, reports of crimes committed during the DOM period of the 1990s began to emerge from Aceh and people mobilized to demand justice. There was widespread anticipation in Aceh that under Habibie’s new democratic regime the members of the military responsible for human rights violations during the DOM period would be held accountable. Habibie took important first steps towards fulfilling this wish. He formally lifted the DOM status, established fact-finding commissions, and authorized investigative reports. To the great disappointment of the Acehnese, however, no military officers were actually punished. On August 7, 1998, the head of the army, General Wiranto, formally apologized for wrongs committed by the military, but this was considered insufficient, as it did not lead to the prosecution and punishment of the responsible officers. The government’s failure to redress the crimes committed in Aceh led to increased popular support for independence and for GAM.
Continued military presence in Aceh heightened the tension. A large number of military personnel were scheduled to leave Aceh by August of 1999. However, the ceremony for departing troops was marked by a riot, an event that was later cited by the military as justification for extending its presence in Aceh. Many believe that the military was responsible for instigating the riot.
In the relative freedom of the post-Suharto government, GAM members who had relocated to Malaysia during the DOM-period began to return. This increase in personnel and supplies in an environment of increasingly public anti-Indonesia sentiment allowed the organization to grow quickly. One of its first actions took place in December 1998, when GAM allegedly carried out an attack on Indonesian soldiers returning from leave. The army, (TNI) responded with a retaliatory attack on the GAM-members who were believed to be responsible. Additionally, the military increased its presence in Aceh, and GAM responded by further increasing its activities.
Confused government policy exacerbated existing tensions and led to increased support for independence. In January 1999, following a referendum on independence for East Timor, Habibie stated that Aceh would also have the opportunity for a referendum, but later retracted this statement. In response to his contradictory comments, Acehnese movements for justice expanded their goals and began to demand self-determination for Aceh via a referendum. At the center of this new movement was a student-led group known as SIRA (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh, or Information Center for a Referendum on Aceh). Government repression of SIRA, a moderate, non-violent movement, further damaged the relationship between Aceh and the Indonesian central government.
In June of 1999, amid escalating tension and increasing violence in the region, Habibie made another attempt to curb discontent in Aceh by appointing a twenty-seven member independent commission to investigate crimes committed during the DOM period. Although the report produced by the commission discussed thousands of cases of violence, it only recommended five of these for prosecution. Out of these five, only one case was actually tried. Further attempts to gain closure on this period and to obtain justice for victims by establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission have been stalled in parliament and show no signs of coming to fruition.
Abdurrahman Wahid, who became president in October of 1999 was not much more successful than his predecessors at stopping the violence. Under his presidency, however, negotiations facilitated by the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), now known as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, began between the government and GAM. HDC was able to facilitate an agreement for a “humanitarian pause”, which was signed on May 12, 2000. The agreement fell somewhat short of a ceasefire and was essentially an attempt to get the parties talking with the goal of reducing violence and eventually reaching a negotiated agreement. It called for setting up committees composed of individuals from both GAM and the government to discuss security and humanitarian issues and violations of the pause. The pause became known as “peace through dialogue.” In spite of the pause, violent attacks committed by both sides – against each other and against civilians – continued.
The military, still a powerful force in Indonesian politics, placed great pressure on President Wahid to authorize strong military action against GAM. In April 2001, the politically weakened leader issued Presidential Instruction No. 4 (Inpres), activating a six-point plan for Aceh. As part of the Inpres, Wahid authorized the military to conduct a “special operation” (Operation for the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law). The goal of the operation was to systematically root out and eradicate GAM and GAM activity. The Indonesian Red Cross states that between the beginning of June and mid-July 2001, 150 people had been killed and 800 homes had been burnt to the ground.
Over the course of the conflict, GAM and military activity has forced many to abandon their homes and villages. Many live in fear as both sides engage in the human rights abuses, including the kidnapping and murder of civilians believed to be military informers or GAM members. Civilians are reluctant to report crimes committed by either GAM or the security forces out of fear for their personal safety. In most cases it has been impossible to determine who is responsible for acts of violence. “Unknown person” has become the most widely used term for the perpetrators of crime, as uniforms are rarely worn and each side blames the other for the attacks.
The upswing in military operations left over 1300 people dead in 2001, more than double the number killed the year before. The violence did not abate in 2002, and over 1600 people were estimated dead by August. Throughout the year, difficult negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian government were mediated by the HDC. On December 9, 2002, these talks came to fruition, and the two sides signed a ceasefire.
Although the cease-fire led to a precipitous drop in the level of hostilities, the confidence- building measures called for were not carried out by either side. Sporadic violence, accompanied by mutual recrimination, strained the agreement. GAM members refused to disarm, and the organization continued to advocate independence. Indonesia’s leaders accused GAM of using the peace agreement as a shield for regrouping and rearming in the absence of a strong Indonesian military presence. GAM has accused Indonesia of not withdrawing its troops and of not being prepared to give Aceh enough autonomy.
As tensions increased, the Joint Security Committee (JSC), composed of monitors from the two belligerent parties and soldiers from Thailand and the Phillipines, became the target of intimidation and violence. Following the torching of one monitoring office and protests at three others, members of the JSC were withdrawn to the regional capital of Bandah Aceh in April, 2003. Given the anti-GAM nature of the protests, there was speculation that the actions against the JSC were prompted by the Indonesian military, who may have sought the removal of the monitors before beginning new military operations.
In April of 2003, emergency talks scheduled between GAM and the Indonesian government were cancelled following lengthy negotiations over the precise date and location of the meetings. The Indonesian government established martial law in May 2003 as part of an effort to eradicate GAM. The government has refused to grant access to aid workers and most journalists, claiming that the risk of kidnapping by GAM rebels is too high. Various advocacy groups including the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch protested the lack of humanitarian access, expressing doubt that the Indonesian government has the capacity to cover the range of assistance needed by the civilian population in Aceh. The government claims that their capacity to provide for the civilian population is being underestimated. Martial law is scheduled to end on November 19, 2003, but it as of October 2003 it is unclear whether it will be extended.
For more information, see:
For more information on specific instances of disappearances and murders, see the Human Rights Watch Report “Indonesia – the War in Aceh” at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/aceh/
Autonomy Legislation
At the root of this conflict lies Aceh’s dissatisfaction with its economic relationship to the central government. GAM has played upon this sentiment to amass popular support for its goal of secession for the province. The government recognizes that resource revenue and governance have been sources of the continuing conflict. Accordingly, since 1998 it has taken gradual steps towards providing a more equitable split of revenue between Aceh and the government and increased autonomy for Aceh over its internal affairs. This process has gone hand in hand with the government’s national initiative to devolve power from the central government to the provinces.
In 1999, laws No. 22 and 25 were passed by the parliament (MPR), increasing the power of local governments and providing for a percentage of each province’s natural resources to be returned to the province. Under these laws, Aceh gained 15 percent of net public income from its oil production, 30 percent from natural gas, and 80 percent from its forestry, mining and fishing industries. At the same time, an additional law, No. 44, was passed. Under this law, Aceh gained a “special status”, that allowed it the right to organize and manage its own religious, cultural and political affairs, within the general guidelines determined by the government. This legislation was considered insufficient by most Acehnese, as the law did not give a significant percentage of natural gas and oil revenue back to the province, and the laws did little to stem the violence.
In August 2001, new legislation was passed giving significantly more revenue to Aceh –55 percent of the income it derives from mining and oil, and 40 percent from natural gas. The new law went into effect in early 2002, although relations with the population of Aceh have not improved as a result. SIRA has expressed its continued desire for the people of Aceh to choose their own path through a referendum, stating that the law is the voice of the legislators and the political elite in Aceh, rather than the wish of the people themselves. GAM representatives have also stated that the law is insufficient, demanding justice for the crimes committed during DOM and secession.
There may be further reasons for the people to doubt the government’s ability to follow through. The provinces of Indonesia have yet to receive any revenue promised under laws No. 22 and 25 and administrative provisions for paying the money to the provinces are not established. While the government may wish to resolve the economic situation, they may be prevented from doing so by macroeconomic constraints. Conditionality on loans provided by the World Bank and the IMF as well as austerity measures imposed by the international financial institutions have proved to be challenging obstacles – most of the money, instead of being distributed to the provinces – is being used to pay down Indonesia’s considerable debt. The provinces of Indonesia have yet to receive any revenue promised under laws No. 22 and 25 and administrative provisions for paying the money to the provinces are not established. While the government may wish to resolve the economic situation, they may be prevented from doing so by macroeconomic constraints. Conditionality on loans provided by the World Bank and the IMF as well as austerity measures imposed by the international financial institutions have proved to be challenging obstacles – most of the money, instead of being distributed to the provinces – is being used to pay down Indonesia’s considerable debt.
Facilitated Negotiations
Negotiations facilitated by the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), began in 2000. While the negotiations were successful at opening lines of communication between the government and the rebel movement, they were not successful at curtailing the violence. Officially, the talks resulted in the signing of a “Joint Understanding on a Humanitarian Pause for Aceh,” which came into effect on 2 June 2000 and succeeded in reducing the violence for about one month, after which cooperation broke down
On July 1, 2001, the Indonesian government suspended the Joint Committee on Security Matters, established by the agreement, until the top GAM commander, Abdullah Syafi’ie, joined negotiations over security for Exxon personnel involved with LNG extraction in Aceh. However, both sides agreed that each would provide for the security of the other’s negotiating team. Despite this security guarantee, six members of the GAM negotiating team were detained at district police headquarters in Bandah Aceh for questioning in late July. This triggered an outcry from the international human rights community and threatened the future of the negotiations. All but one, who was taken to Jakarta for further questioning, were subsequently released with conditions about one month later.
After many months of negotiations, the parties signed the 9 December 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). The HDC maintains an office in Indonesia to monitor the conflict.
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