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West Papua/Irian Jaya
The Conflict |
In the decades that followed the "Act of Free Choice", the OPM and other civilian voices for independence were quieted, but not silenced. The installation of a heavy military presence that begun in the late 1960s continued, ushering in to West Papua/Irian Jaya a time of sporadic violence, ethnic subjugation and assimilation, and a stifled political climate.
In 1998, with Suharto’s resignation bringing an end to military rule, community leaders resurrected their call for independence. The initial responses from Jakarta were lukewarm, as the government agreed to establish lines of communication with Papuan nationalists. However, after a Papuan delegation met with President Habibe in 1999 to discuss independence, the talks were shut down and a new round of authoritarian control in West Papua/Irian Jaya was resumed. Essentially, the new Habibe administration appeared interested in engaging conciliatory rhetoric, but unwilling to commit practically to genuine reforms.
Despite Jakarta’s inconsistent approach to West Papua/Irian Jaya, many Papuans felt that the end of the Suharto era signaled an end to illegitimate Indonesian rule, and began raising the stakes. Although the raising of the Papuan nationalist flag was a criminal act punishable by a prison sentence, flag-raising became a prominent method of protest with more and more Papuans joining in. The general atmosphere in 1999 was more lenient of flag-raising, if less predictable, than preceding years. While some flag-raising protests were allowed, others were stamped out, sometimes resulting in arrests and deaths.
For more information, see Human Rights Watch West Papua Report 2001.
Papuan Independence and the Wahid Administration
After decades of continuous rule under the Suharto regime, Indonesia democratically elected President Abdurrahman Wahid in October 1999. Wahid publicly announced that the Indonesian government should accept blame for part of West Papua/Irian Jaya’s difficulties and that reforms would be instituted promptly. In an even more unexpected move, Wahid, who had spent New Year’s Day 2000 in West Papua/Irian Jaya, announced that the name of the region should once again be changed back to West Papua. However, Wahid also made it clear that he did not favor outright independence for West Papua/Irian Jaya.
In the months following Wahid’s election, the Morning Star flag was freely raised and preparations were made for a Papuan People’s Congress which would serve as a clearing-house for Papuan concerns, grievances, and proposals. On December 1, 1999 Papuans held a rally announcing the anniversary of the declaration of West Papuan independence, first “achieved” on December 1, 1961. Although flag-raisings were permitted on the day of the rally, and violence was avoided, the following day witnessed a number of deadly clashes between independence supporters and the Indonesian military.
During a preparatory meeting, known as the Great Consultation, for the upcoming Congress, the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) was formed. The PDP, which would serve as the administrative head of the Papuan independence movement, was created as a largely inclusive body with leaders from various branches of politics, religion, academia, and the community. The OPM, guerilla operatives fighting for Papuan independence since the early 1960s, was ultimately excluded. The Congress, a gathering of several thousand Papuans, was marked by debate as to how West Papua/Irian Jaya’s future could be best realized. Ultimately, the Congress declared in early June 2000 that West Papua/Irian Jaya was an independent and sovereign nation.
Click here to read the Papuan Congress Resolution.
The culmination of the Congress was a high-water mark in Papuan independence efforts. The congressional declaration of independent sovereignty wrought a shift in Jakarta’s perspective on Papuans. President Wahid subsequently stated publicly that the congress was illegitimate, and although he believed the freedom of political views to be worth protection, organized threats to Indonesian sovereignty were illegal and unacceptable.
During the latter half of 2000 and 2001 the approach of Wahid’s administration changed significantly. Wahid’s political adversaries used the congress as leverage to spin the Wahid administration as anti-Indonesian. Such power plays in Jakarta helped move the central government’s position on West Papua/Irian Jaya closer to the more conservative stance of the Suharto/Habibe rule.
Although many Papuans were empowered by the congress and began to expect independence, the actual and immediate result was a crackdown of military and police units throughout West Papua/Irian Jaya. In addition to the changing political calculus in Jakarta, another variable affecting state-province relations was the formation of Papuan Taskforces which had come about during the Great Consultation as a security measure. The Taskforces primarily consisted of Papuan youth and were dominated by the politics of Papuan liberation. Although the Taskforces provided an outlet for Papuan empowerment and pride, they also degenerated on occasion into roving bands of violence primarily aimed at Javanese migrants. This violence served as a further catalyst for harsher military rule, and ultimately the banning of the Papuan national flag.
Special Autonomy versus Independence
As part of Wahid’s conciliatory efforts, a group known as the Forum to Examine Special Autonomy Laws for a New Papua submitted an offer of special autonomy to the MPR in April 2001. The Forum is comprised of local administration officials, NGO activists, and councilors, and is not aligned with the political stance of the PDP and OPM. A month before the submission, West Papua/Irian Jaya’s local government held a workshop in the capital city to discuss autonomy. The Papuans ultimately walked out of the meeting in protest, demanding independence over autonomy for West Papua. Given the fractured atmosphere in the province, it is not at all clear that a Megawati-approved autonomy bill in the future would satisfy Papuan demands for independence.
The question of autonomy was first officially broached after Suharto’s resignation, as pressures were quickly mounting on the newly appointed Habibe. Hoping to assuage growing resentment and facilitate the decentralization process, Habibe presented two proposals to the MPR. These laws, passed in April 1999, created an important division of powers between the central and regional authorities. Defense, foreign affairs, religion, the administration of justice and monetary and fiscal policy remained core duties of the central government, while public services such as education, health care and infrastructure now fell under regional control. A previously existing hierarchical relationship between the provinces was also eliminated. Under the new laws, provinces would receive a significantly larger portion of the central government’s revenues, including 15% of onshore oil revenues, 30% of onshore gas revenues, roughly 80% of mining and forestry revenues, 20% of local income-tax receipts and about 25% of a special fund of centrally collected revenue.
The nomenclature of the process involves the offer of "regional autonomy" to all provinces, as described above, and "special autonomy" to the more unstable regions of West Papua/Irian Jaya and Aceh. Although the definition of "special autonomy" in this context is still somewhat unclear, the offer includes the economic benefits of the regional plans, as well as greater political independence and control. However, the central government’s offer prohibits a referendum on independence, insisting that while moderate autonomous growth may be permissible, this will in no way jeopardize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Indonesian state.
The Papuan bill for special autonomy, proposed in April 2001, has 76 clauses outlining West Papua’s demands that would ultimately end its formal wishes for independence and bring West Papua much fuller and more substantive control over its domestic affairs. Some of the bill’s contents include the following:
- Any "indigenous" Papuan inhabitant must have at least one Papuan parent
- Special autonomy applies to the indivisible province of Papua, as opposed to local regencies as usually applied under regional autonomy laws
- Papuan provincial parliament will consist of two chambers with an upper house of indigenous officials and a lower house for political representatives
- A Papuan flag, symbol, and anthem
- Papua to have all governmental powers except international political relations, external defense, monetary policy, and the supreme court
- Papua to have its own police force
- Papuan provincial government to control all taxation resources, with 20% of the revenue to go to the central government
- The creation of a human rights court
- The granting of a right to compensation for all victims of past human rights abuses
- A guarantee of religious freedom
- The ending of transmigration policies
- The Papuan right to self-determination if a special historical commission decides that the annexation of Papua into Indonesia is illegal under international law
The bill was passed by the Indonesian parliament on October 22, 2001. In its final form, it gives West Papua 70 percent of royalties from mining and 80 percent from logging and fishing. Additionally, the law grants the province its own flag and anthem and changes the name of the province from Irian Jaya to Papua. The bill is scheduled to enter into effect on December 22, 2001 during a visit by Megawati to the province.
Likelihood of Continuation
The brief Wahid administration probably posed the greatest chance for West Papuan reconciliation, despite the often paradoxical relations between Jakarta and the province between 1999 and 2001. However, it is likely that despite Wahid’s rhetoric of moderation and appeasement, West Papua’s hopes for independence would never have been realized. Wahid had even said as much, claiming that Papuan independence was an affront to Indonesian unity.
Shortly after becoming president in July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri assigned the newly appointed vice-president Hamzah Haz the role of implementing special autonomy in West Papua. The new administration has consistently stated that independence is not an option.
There were high hopes within the government that the special autonomy bill on October 22, 2001, would quell support for the separatist movement in West Papua. However, the pro-independence Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) immediately rejected the bill, saying that the Papuan people had not been sufficiently involved in the process and that it failed to address past human rights abuses. Nonetheless, many felt that the bill would still be received positively by many in West Papua.
The reconciliation process experienced a major setback on November 10, 2001, when Theys Eluay, president of the Papua Presidium Council and a venerated independence leader, was killed in an apparent assassination. News of the killing sparked rioting in the capital and many feared that a renewal in the conflict was inevitable. Supporters of Eluay have claimed that the military was responsible for the killing. However, the military denies culpability and no blame has been placed on any group as of early December 2001. Observers have called for the government to create an independent commission to investigate this sensitive issue. The special autonomy bill is scheduled to enter into effect on December 22, 2001 and it remains to be seen how it will be received. In a troubling move, the government announced in late November 2001 that it planned to rotate military forces, around 50 battalions through West Papua and other separatist provinces throughout Indonesia. This has led to fears that the government is prepared to use military force, rather than to solve conflicts through dialogue and negotiation.
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