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West Timor
Actors
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Militias
An estimated 3,000 pro-Indonesian militia members were involved in the expulsions of pro-independence supporters into West Timor in 1999. After an international force was deployed in East Timor, the militias were also expelled into West Timor. There they have continued to terrorize the refugee populations and caused humanitarian organizations to suspend their operations.
The militias, a network of thirteen, were originally organized and trained by members of the Indonesian military ahead of the August 1999 ballot in East Timor. Their mission was ostensibly to defend the population against the impending violence by pro-independence guerillas and youth groups. However, after the announcement of the pro-independence results of the polls in September, the militias launched an unchecked campaign of violence, murder and destruction. Many believe that overwhelming evidence shows the TNI formed, funded, armed and directed the militias in an attempt to derail the referendum.
It is widely believed that the militias currently operate with the support of the Indonesian military, stationed in West Timor to protect the refugee camps. Suspected collaboration between TNI and militia members has given militias wide access to the camps and facilitated their attempts to control refugees in West Timor. One indication of this is that militia members, who were formerly in the TNI, are free to carry firearms and dress in military-style uniforms inside and outside the camps.
The international community has urged the Indonesian government to conduct a systematic investigation of militia leaders who have been linked to specific human rights abuses both in East and West Timor. At present, however no Indonesian military officers or militia leaders have been brought to trail for the expulsion of the East Timor refugees or for the crimes committed in East and West Timor.
See Urgent Need for Independent Timor Investigation: http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/09/timor0908.htm
Several of the militias are well known and can be broken down into two different groups; those that began in the 1970s and those that formed more recently. The three largest militias, Aitarak, Besi Merah Putih (Iron Rod for the Red and White) and Mahidi (an acronym for Live or Die for Integration with Indonesia) are all relatively new organizations that were organized in the late 1990s after former President Habibie ’s government declared it was willing to consider the option of independence for East Timor. Among the older militias are Halilintar (Thunderbolt) and Saka. Prominent militia leaders include Eurico Gutteres (Aitarak), Joao Tavares (Halilintar), and Cancio de Carvalho (Mahidi).
Aitarak and Eurico Guterres
Aitarak, one of the largest and most notorious militias is headed by Eurico Guterres. Guterres, once a pro-independence supporter, was abducted by the Indonesian military in 1991 and tortured extensively. After being released he became the leader of Aitarak and, the deputy war commander of the militia war command known as Milisia Pro Otonomi (MPO). He is also leader of Gardapaski (Youth Guard for Upholding Integration), the youth-wing of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s political party.
On June 7, 1999 the Indonesian government, through district head, Domingos Soares, appointed Guterres to head the civil defense corps (PAM Swakarsa) based in Dili, East Timor. Despite the fact that he did not end up serving in the position, it is reported that Aitarak received military training and non-lethal equipment from Kopassus, the elite red-beret wing of the Indonesian military.
Various human rights groups have called for Guterres to be accused and tried on several counts of human rights violations and crimes against humanity. However, his ties to the Indonesian government, including the fact that he is leader of Gardapaski (Youth Guard for Upholding Integration), the youth-wing of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s political party, appear to contribute to the fact that he has, to date, successfully avoided serious punishment. In October 2000, Guterres was brought to trial but he was released three weeks into the six-month sentence he was supposed to serve.
See East Timor Federation's letter to UNSG regarding Eurico Guterres: http://www.blythe.org/nytransfer-subs/99pac/E_Timor_Federation's_letter_to_UNSG_re:_Eurico_Guterres
See Timor: Indonesia Recruits Militia into Police Force:
http://www.blythe.org/nytransfer-subs/99pac/Timor:_Indonesia_Recruits_Militia_into__Police__force
See IFET letter to UN Secretary General on the appointment of Eurico Gutteres: http://home.snafu.de/watchin/Eurico.htm
General documents on Militias:
Human Rights Watch: The Indonesian Army and Civilian Militias in East Timor : http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/apr/etmilitia.htm
Human Rights Watch: Questions and Answers on East Timor: http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/timor/q2
The Indonesian Government
The response from the Indonesian government to the refugee situation in West Timor has been ambiguous at best. On the one hand, Indonesia promised to provide security for the refugees and the humanitarian workers in the camps. Yet, despite repeated calls by the international community to end militia violence, the government seems unable to eliminate their presence. Humanitarian groups and NGOs insist that Indonesia must disarm the militias and ensure the refugees return.
For the most part, Indonesian efforts at refugee registration and repatriation have met with some degree of success. From the beginning of the crisis, the government promised to aid the UN in its continued efforts to repatriate refugees from West Timor. As part of these efforts, in November 1999, an agreement was signed between INTERFET and the Indonesian army to facilitate repatriation. A year later, in September 2000, Indonesia and the UN signed an agreement to work together to resolve the fate of the remaining refugees. The Indonesian government also established an Inter-Ministerial Task Force (SATGAS) to create a solution for the refugees. As a result, along with the international aid organizations, it helped to facilitate the repatriation of over half of the refugees thus far.
Not all refugees were repatriated however and a large number still remain in the camps. Many are now subject to intimidation by militias preventing them from deciding freely whether to return to East Timor. International critics believe that a June 2001 registration drive sponsored by the government, that showed 95% of the refugees voted to remain in Indonesia is flawed and that many refugees were forced to vote against repatriation. They charge that the prominent role of the Indonesian military and militias in the process, the continuing presence of weapons in the camps, and confusing registration materials contribute to inaccurate results.
Overall, Indonesia has estimated it needs at least 197 million dollars to relocate some 1.25 million of its people who have been made homeless but less than 20 percent of this sum is available, a minister said Thursday.
Analysts claim that the government has also done little in the way of accountability and bringing perpetrators of violence to justice, despite international pressure. There is much evidence to suggest that Indonesian military officers and generals were involved in plotting militia violence and the expulsion of the refugees. However, no Indonesian military officers or militia leaders have been brought to trail for the expulsion of the East Timor refugees or for the crimes committed in West and East Timor. The Indonesian Attorney General’s Office last year released a list of suspects involved in human rights violations in East Timor in 1999, however the list omitted several senior officers, including former military commander General Wiranto who is regarded by many as “morally responsible” for the crimes committed in East Timor. In October 2000, Indonesia arrested militia leader Eurico Guterres, head of Aitarak (for the second time) however his trail was considered a “show trial” and he was given only six months in jail.
In response to the murder of the UNHCR workers, the Indonesian government subsequently arrested six East Timorese militiamen and set a trial for January 2001 at an Indonesian court in Jakarta. However, despite the fact that the six defendants admitted their guilt, they were sentenced, in May 2001, to only for 10 to 20 months in prison, prompting huge outrage by the international community.
In April 2001, former President Wahid issued a decree authorizing the establishment of a special court to hear cases of gross human rights violations that took place in East Timor after the ballot. But many of the crimes investigated by state prosecutors and the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) took place in the months preceding the ballot. The new Indonesian President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, has recently widened the scope of the court to hear cases of alleged crimes committed before the independence vote, when some of the worst killings took place.
The Indonesian Military (TNI)
The Indonesian military is also not free from blame for the violence in West and East Timor. Many believe that the expulsion of the refugees from East Timor by the militias was a planned and systematic operation coordinated with the Indonesian military. Indonesian officials insist that the military’s role was to ensure the safe evacuation of migrants, civil servants, and pro-Indonesian East Timorese. However, refugee accounts claim that when militia members forced them to flee, they were often accompanied by local army officers who also provided the trucks that carried them to West Timor.
It is widely believed that Kopassus, the elite red-beret force of the Indonesian military began to train East Timorese militias in order to take advantage of the portion of the population that favored autonomy (integration) instead of independence. When President Habibe announced that the 1999 referendum in East Timor was to be held, Kopassus created pro-integration militias in all thirteen districts of East Timor. The ranks of these militias were made up of mostly non-Timorese individuals from other parts of Indonesia. For more information on the Kopassus-milita alliance, see Tapol Bulletin.
Now, in West Timor there is alleged cooperation between militias and the military who are supposed to guard the camps. Reports of continued violence claim that the Indonesian military permit militias to enter the camps and to continue their attacks. Moreover, the fact that members of the TNI make up some of the inhabitants of the refugee camps creates a troublesome situation. Those that support autonomy work in conjunction with the militias and the elements of the TNI present in West Timor as informant or as direct accomplices to the violence taking place in the camps.
Tapol Bulletin: http://www.melanesia.org/views/tapolNov1999.htm
See Report on the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili, 8 to 12 September 1999:
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/missionreports/976e.pdf
International Community
The international community has been deeply concerned by what it sees as neglect of the violence facing the refugees in West Timor and some have been highly critical of the Indonesian government. In some cases, donors have threatened to withhold future aid if Indonesia does not take more definitive steps to curb the violence.
A recent UN-commissioned report, declared, “the continued forced detention of those East Timorese in refugee camps in West Timor who wish to return to their homeland… is one of the most serious crimes against humanity” committed in East Timor in 1999.
See Interim report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/436e.pdf
The International Community was equally outraged by the UNHCR killings and the extremely lenient sentences given to the suspects. The US government has insisted that Indonesian properly punish the killers before the United States can resume full military ties. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the US embassy in Jakarta, the Australian government and numerous other aid donors have expressed shock and outrage at the sentences and condemned the Indonesian government for allowing militia activity to continue.
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