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West Timor
Refugee Situation
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Of the 200,000 refugees who fled the post-referendum violence into West Timor in 1999, most were pro-independence supporters expelled by anti-independence militias. However, militia members and their top commanders were themselves forced to flee East Timor upon the arrival of international forces there. Many escaped to West Timor where they have terrorized the East Timorese refugee population and humanitarian workers.
Indonesian military personnel were also among those expelled to West Timor. Just as in the civilian population, the ranks of the TNI were split along pro-independence and pro-autonomy lines. Approximately 24,000 of the refugees were members and families of the military. It is suspected that many of these military officials have provided support to the militias in the camps.
Since November 1999, more than half of the refugees have been able to return to their homes in East Timor. However, aid agencies report that as of August 2001, 70,000 are still languishing in refugee camps in West Timor. According to many accounts, a large percentage of those individuals still desire to return to East Timor. Currently, it is difficult to obtain accurate reports on the exact numbers of refugees because access to the camps is limited.
Conditions in the Camps
Refugee camps were established by UNHCR in West Timor at the end of 1999 until repatriation and transfer become possible. These camps are located in the northeast portion of West Timor, outside of the cities of Atambua, Betun, Kefamenanu and Kupang. At present, many camps are still in operation, however most are now run by militia officials.
The camps vary in size and structure but conditions in general are extremely poor. Some camps offer shelter in the form of converted buildings while others consist of straw huts and tents walled with plastic sheeting. In addition, an undetermined number of refugees reside with friends or family members who live in West Timor. In other cases, family members were separated when they were brought to the camps and some have still not come together.
Quality of life in the refugee camps is rapidly deteriorating with food shortages and epidemics rampant. As most humanitarian organizations are gone, camps often lack food, water, medical provisions and proper sanitary conditions. There have been reports of many children dying however, detailed information on the conditions of the refugees is limited as there is little access to the camps.
Among the most serious dangers facing refugees is the presence of militias within their populations. The militias, who now control daily life in the camps, frequently conduct sweeps targeting former independence supporters. Refugees are continually subjected to intimidation, abductions and massacres by the militias; women refugees face widespread sexual abuse.
The refugee crisis has also placed a large burden on the resources of West Timor, one of the poorest provinces of Indonesia. At one point, refugees equaled or outnumbered the West Timorese population, creating major tensions between locals and refugees. Poor conditions in the camps have continued to escalate tensions with the local populations. As a result, many humanitarian aid organizations have focused efforts on conflict resolution training between the local populations and the refugees. In some cases, local populations have also been provided with food and supplies. Many of the local villages however have refused to consider accepting refugee resettlement in their villages.
Repatriation
Following the deployment of a multi-national force (International Force in East Timor, INTERFET) in October 1999, security was restored to most areas of East Timor and many refugees began returning home. However, aid agencies report that as of August 2001, 70,000 refugees still remain in camps in West Timor. A recent registration drive administered by the Indonesian government reported that 95% of the refugees do not wish to return to East Timor. However, the UN and international humanitarian agencies claim these numbers are not accurate. International critics suggest the results of such a count may have been hampered by militia intimidation and discrepancies in the voting procedure. Regardless, significant obstacles remain to repatriation and the process has slowed down considerably.
The primary concern for refugees seeking to repatriate is intimidation and violence committed by militias present in the camps. This includes death threats against families seeking to leave and attacks on convoys heading back for East Timor. In addition to physical intimidation, militias and the West Timorese press together have allegedly run a massive disinformation campaign in the refugee camps that publish false reports about the violence in East Timor that awaits pro-independence supporters returning home. On the contrary, violence against returning refugees has been minimal.
While many of those returning to East Timor were able to do so successfully, the transfer of refugees is not without incident. Reports indicate that militias are hostile to UNHCR efforts to repatriate East Timorese and as a result, UNHCR has had to conduct “snatch and run” operations moving as quickly as possible to extract refugees before militia members can act.
In addition to concerns of violence, some refugees have economic incentives for wanting to stay in Indonesia. Many of those who worked as Indonesian civil servants in East Timor will not receive their salaries or pensions unless they remain in Indonesia. As a result, a small percentage of refugees chose to relocate to other parts of Indonesia.
If a high numbers of refugees do want to stay in Indonesia, this may increase tensions with local populations. The West Timor governor has expressed concerns about the economic and social burden placed on the West Timor region and, in an attempt to encourage refugees to return to the UN-administered East Timor, the military chief in West Timor has offered 750,000 rupiah (approximately $70) to each person who registers to return. Only 7,200 were repatriated through UNHCR in the first six months of 2001, bringing the total number to 182,000. IOM has returned 600 refugees to East Timor between 30 November and 5 December and another 235 refugees were scheduled to return on 8 December. Between 60,000 and 100,000 refugees remain in camps in West Timor.
For more information, see:
UNHCR Update report on East Asia: http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/fdrs/my2001/overeas.pdf
Humanitarian Aid Organizations
The two main organizations responsible for administering the refugee repatriation process are the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, some UN agencies and many local and international NGOs have provided services in the area. Among those are, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, OXFAM Australia, the Australian Red Cross, CONCERN, the Danish Refugee Council and the International Rescue Committee. Several West Timorese NGOs have also aided the refugees. (A complete list of these agencies can be found at http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/ga2001/tmp.pdf.)
In September 2000, UNHCR and most aid organizations suspended operations in West Timor in the aftermath of the killing of three UNHCR workers by militias. At present, most humanitarian organizations only carry out small operations in West Timor in order to provide minimum supplies to the camps.
Prior to the suspension, UNHCR’s mission in West Timor was to assist the safety of the refugees while the repatriation process was completed. This included providing food, water, shelter, health and sanitation services, transportation counseling, legal services and arranging and financing returnee convoys. As many refugees fled their homes without their personal belongings, UNHCR was responsible for providing necessary domestic needs and household support such as blankets, kitchen equipment and sheets.
Militias have repeatedly attacked humanitarian aid workers, denied them access to the camps, hampered their ability to distribute food and in a few cases kidnapped workers.
More than 120 incidents of harassment and violence against aid workers were recorded from August 1999 until September 2000 and UNHCR was forced to suspended its operations on several occasions.
The most serious attack was the September 2000 murder of three UNHCR staff workers from Croatia, Ethiopia and the United States, after thousands of militia-led rioters attacked the UNHCR office in Atambua. The workers were beaten to death and their bodies set on fire. The attack remains the worst attack ever on UNHCR. Following the murders, UN peacekeepers from East Timor evacuated all 462 international aid workers in West Timor and almost all local aid workers. The UN Security Council condemned the killings and urged Jakarta to disarm the militias. The Indonesian government responded by arresting the suspected killers, however, despite their admission of guilt, a court in Jakarta sentenced the men to only 10 to 20 months in prison.
Most agencies have refused to resume their work until the Indonesian government can provide adequate security and the militias can be brought under control. The UN dispatched a security assessment mission to West Timor in early July 2001, the result of which has not been reported as of the date of this writing. However, UNHCR officials have recently met with Indonesian officials to discuss the prospects of refugee repatriation.
UNHCR plans to continue its voluntary repatriation operation until June 2001. These plans result from funding constraints as well as a desire to pull out of East and West Timor once the transition to East Timorese independence is fully implemented.
See UNHCR Map of Refugee Camps: http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/maps/pacific/timor006.pdf
See The Refugee Crisis and Accountability: http://www.etan.org/news/2000a/wtimorese
See UNHCR Timor Report 1999: http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/gr99/timor.pdf
See UNHCR Timor Report 2000: http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/ga2000/pdf/timor.pdf
See UNHCR Timor mid-year Report 2000: http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/my2000/timor.pdf
See UNHCR Timor Report 2001: http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/ga2001/tmp.pdf
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