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Conference Report
Introduction
Background
Causes of Instability
Territorial Integrity
History
Political System
   Democracy
   Decentralization
   Institutional Stability
   Leadership
   Military
   Recommendations
Society & Culture
Economic System
Role of NGOs
Recommendations
Appendices
Bahasa Version (pdf)
English Version (pdf)
Political System: Role of the Military
 
The Indonesian military is seen by many as an integral cause, but perhaps also a potential solution, to many of the security problems facing the Indonesia people. Despite its many shortcomings, it seems inevitable that the army will continue to play an important role, as it remains one of the few organizations with real managerial experience. Indonesians and outsiders must work to ensure that this role is constructive.

The army is considered by some to be the institution most responsible for tearing the country apart through human rights violations, thuggery, corruption and intimidation. Its critics note that decades of cooperation with other armies and overseas training have not convinced the military to combat corruption, to empower the civilian leadership or to respect human rights. Senior staff have gone unpunished for past atrocities in Aceh, Timor and most notably in East Timor. This display of unaccountability and impunity has provided little incentive to troops to curb their violence. An example of the ongoing aggressiveness is the continuing military policy in Aceh. The Indonesian parliament has authorized the military to conduct a “limited military operation” (recently renamed a “limited security operation”). The operation is aimed at the leadership of the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) separatists, even the official army spokesman has admitted that it is difficult to guarantee that there will not be civilian victims. Some have suggested that the number of civilians harmed by the army in Aceh may be as high as 1 person every 4 hours.

Other observers believe that military reform has gone further than critics credit. Evidence to support this belief may be seen in the military’s recent opposition to the imposition of a state of emergency and the dissolution of the parliament, although there may be other and more political reasons for the military’s opposition.

Opinions are also divided on the ways in which the Indonesian government and outsiders should relate to the military. Many observers are wary of compromise and believe constant pressure will be required to push the army to the political margins and to contain its activities to the military’s usual sphere. The opposing view stresses that refusing to interact with the military as a political actor would be to exclude an important player and to fail to take advantage of opportunities to expand military horizons.

Economic constraints are among the major causes of military excesses. The Indonesian government funds only 25% of the army’s requirements in terms of living expenses, salaries and military equipment. This shortfall leaves soldiers at all levels in a constant search for money, distracting them from their duties and supplying them with incentives to prey on the civilian population. In areas where separatism is rife and the people are unprepared to assist the military, the soldiers’ efforts to secure money are particularly unpopular. In addition, the involvement of the military in business is widely criticized.

It is unlikely that the cash-strapped government will be able to fund the army properly in the coming years but still mechanisms should be considered to increase military professionalism and to move down the path towards transparent military funding.

Recommendations
  • An increase in military salaries could help eliminate corruption within the military and eliminate the incentive for rapacious behavior among soldiers and the resulting civilian hostility. Financial security could free time and energy for training troops, for example, on the rules of engagement and the humanitarian treatment of civilians. To pay for salary increases, a reduction in the total number of soldiers should be considered, as fewer but more professional soldiers could do the same job.
  • In those crisis areas where professional behavior is paramount to the accomplishment of the mission, soldiers could be paid dramatically higher “combat pay” and could be provided with special funding for equipment.
  • If military involvement in business continues to be necessary, ventures must be transparent and subject to the legal guidelines that apply to other Indonesian businesses and charities. An aggressive audit of military ventures and other off-budget activities should be considered.
  • In addition, the police needs to be reformed and trained in non-violent methods of crowd control to act as an independent complement to the army.






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